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Abstract
Forestry ecosystem of Democratic Republic of the Congo is the base of rural people economy. But, 
these people do not have sustainable practices on natural resources. Therefore, the objective Pursued in 
achieving the present study is to determine the impact of the peasant practices on the local natural 
resources and to analyze the role of traditional power in Ngbete and Mabanga’s villages. To achieve 
this, we submitted 63 persons to a mixed questionnaire. We completed the methodology in using the 
unstructured individual interviews. The average age of those surveyed varies between 30 and 50 years. 
The main findings show that the traditional authority doesn’t influence positively the sustainable use of 
wildlife. Though, the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (CINC or ICCN in French) which is 
in charge of Rubi-Tele hunting domain hasn’t the appropriate means for taking care of this protected 
area. In this case, the traditional authority who could ensure the sustainable management of natural 
resources, especially the wildlife, is in the lack of legitimacy whose the roof taken in the history of 
creation of these villages, namely Mabanga and Ngbete. This situation leads to the scarcity of wildlife 
which is the main source of peasant’s income. 
Keywords: traditional authority, governance, wildlife resources, Rubi-Tele hunting domain,
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Eliezer Majambu et al.
― 235 ―
??の???は??が??し、クリエイティブ･コモンズ??4.0??ライセンス（CC-BY）?に??します。 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.ja
2. Conceptual approach and methodological framework
2.1. Presentation and justification of the case study
The Mabanga and Ngbete villages (Figure1) are part of the Bobate group,which is one of eight groups 
present in Rubi-Tele hunting domain. Created by the law N° 51/Agri of 12th November 1930 and 
supplemented by the law N° 61 / Agri of 26th November 1932 amending the boundaries of this hunting 
domain; the latter covers 5 administrative territories which three of them (Aketi, Buta, Bambesa) belong 
to the Bas-Uele province others territories namely (Banalia and Basoko) are in Tshopo province. When 
it was created, this protected area extended over an area of 11,302,72 km2, but nowadays, it occupies 
only 6227.74 km2.
The interest that led us to carry our attention on Mabanga and Ngbete villages is justified by the 
fact that this protected area has remained nearly 80 years after its creation, neglected without benefiting
necessary means to allow the Congolese Institute of Nature Conservation (CINC) to assume its role.
Faced this reality, wildlife resources are used unsustainably. In addition to this, the choice of Mabanga
and Ngbete villages is due to their accessibility because they are located along the national road 
(Kisangani-Buta).
Figure 1. Location of surveyed villages in Rubi-Tele hunting domain
  
1. Introduction
The forest of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accounts for sixty percent (60%) of Congo 
Basin forests; and forty-seven percent (47%) of Africa's forests. It is therefore a real global lung, after
the Amazon (Oyono et al. 2006, Eba'a Atyi and Bayol 2009). Indeed, considered as an important 
reservoir of biodiversity, the DRC forest is a vital resource for human beings (Counsell 2006). Since 
more than 70% of the population depends directly on it (World Bank 2003). Behind the forest-wood, 
also hides the real forest which is travelled, worked, modified and rebuilt by the farmers. It is this forest
that is the base of village’s economy and therefore their heritage. This latter is managed according to 
so-called ‘customary’ norms, rules and practices defined, effective and respected at the local level
(Michon and Moizo 2011). 
It Cline-Cole is clear that the elements of biodiversity that we have reached nowadays are because 
they were used sustainably. Formally, the exploitation of the resources, in particular, the fauna was made
in harmony with spirits of the ancestors and under the guidance of the traditional institutions (Chambers 
and Conway 1991, Bonye 2007). 
Today, the sustainable use of forest resources by local communities cannot be proven since all the 
world's societies experience socio-culture mutation (Kyale and Maindo 2017) due to the globalization.
Yantibossi (2011) goes further; the mentality of local populations has evolved in using the gift of nature. 
Despite this reality, customary power remains the true manager of grassroots communities in the rural 
areas (Bonye 2007) and therefore best placed to help the government in achieving its goals for the
Sustainable Development (SDG).Considering the above, we propose, as part of this study to analyze the 
perceptions of users of the wildlife that the power of village leaders Ngbete and Mabanga, finding in 
Rubi-Tele hunting domain. 
Thus, we believe that the population of Mabanga and Ngbete villages perceives the wildlife 
resources found in Rubi-Tele hunting domain as their ownership. This perception is reinforced by the 
lack of leadership on the part of traditional authorities on the one hand, and negligence if not oblivion 
plaguing the DCRT from the State Congo foreshore and conservation NGOs on the other hand.  
The structure of this article is organized in four parts. In the remainder of this brief introduction, 
we detail in the second part of the text the conceptual approach and methodology. This part includes a 
presentation and justification of the case study, the mode of collection of our quantitative and qualitative 
data, and the analytical approach used to treat such data. The third part of the article presents the findings 
and discusses the validity compared to similar studies conducted in relatively comparable political social 
contexts in Africa and throughout the tropics. The latter part of the article proposes a succinct conclusion 
of the study. 
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3. Findings and discussion
3.1. Unsustainable governance of wildlife resources in Rubi-Tele hunting domain 
Empirically, our work shows that several factors hind the sustainable governance of wildlife in Rubi-
Tele hunting domain in general and in Mabanga and Ngbete villages in particular. The most raised 
during our data field collection are: 
3.2. The omission of Rubi-Tele hunting domain as much as by the government than the NGOs of 
conservation 
With an area of 6,227.74 km2, the hunting domain of Rubi-Tele has only 42 agents assigned by the 
Congolese Institute of Nature Conservation to secure this protected area. Consequently, each guard has 
to watch on an area of 148.27 km2. Curiously, only 6 of the 42 agents are paid by the Congolese 
government, the others are not. The sole argument from government is the fact that the concerned are 
new recruits though some of these ‘new officers’ have more than 15 years of service. This situation 
reveals how the management of this hunting domain is not a priority as well as for government as the 
NGOs. Concerning the latter, the conservator in chief of this hunting domain, testifies in saying that: 
‘we didn’t receive financial support from partners till in 2012. We received the foundation of Therese 
art. When they came, we hoped that at the end of their remote sensing and the wildlife inventory, this 
hunting domain would be known and through their scientific report, the partners would be attracted. 
Unfortunately, their work was stopped and from that time they haven’t been back’. Though, this hunting 
domain is the living place of some species strictly protected as Okapi Johnstoni. 
3.3. Governance characterized by mistrust of actors
The continued misuse of wildlife resources leads to the imposition of ineffective punitive measure which 
tends to further erode the influence of traditional rulers (Majambu et al. 2019; Lewis et al. n.d.). The 
absence of boundaries between hunting grounds and villages is one of the causes of this mistrust. This 
observation is strengthened by the fact that almost ¾ of those investigations (this proportion is higher in
Ngbete than in Mabanga) they assert to master upstream and downstream of Rubi-Tele hunting domain. 
The lack of clear boundaries of this hunting domain on the one hand and the one of financing and to 
take in charge the Congolese institute of nature conservation’s agents; leads the wildlife users to misuse 
resources. The wildlife resources’ users accuse the Congolese institute of nature conservation’s agents 
to mismanage this hunting domain. For them, this hunting domain was well managed when chieftaincy 
was in charge of management of the hunting domain land. Thus, the participants at the focus group 
organized with villages’ actors at Bokapo argue that: ‘may the management of this hunting domain be 
returned at our chieftaincy. When it was the case before the coming of colonizer this area was well 
managed. Since the Congolese institute of nature conservation is in charge of management, the 
depletion of wildlife resources goes worse and worse’. For the CINC it is the population who abides in 
2.2. Collection of data
This study is based on a mixed methodological approach of qualitative and quantitative analysis 
(Creswell 2009). Qualitatively, the first part of this research was structured around the household survey,
because they constitute the basic unit of resource exploitation in a village, then two focus groups and 
numerous individual interviews were conducted in villages Mabanga and Ngbete. The aim of this 
approach was to collect the opinions and testimonies of peasants and managers of the hunting domain 
based at the checkpoint notably their experiences on the change observed over the years in the 
production of the game, on the availability of wildlife resource, the involvement of traditional authorities 
in the regulation of access to wildlife resource, the contribution of the checkpoint Sukisa in the 
management of that area. To achieve our purpose, the survey was close to 63 households among them
32 to Mabanga and 31 Ngbete were involved in the investigation by questionnaire. The questions were 
about the observed change in access to wildlife resources, the frequency of hunting, the number of games 
taken by hunters, the most captured species, the level of production, the legitimacy of the authority of 
village leaders in the regulation of hunting and the capacity of CINC to assume its role. These 
informations were intersected and crossed with those from individual interviews (18) and focus groups 
made during our field study. 
2.3. An analytical approach guided by the logic of induction
To better capture the logic of the actors studied as part of this study, qualitative data collected were 
analysed using an approach comprehensive type ‘systemic’ (Morin 1977). Their interpretation has been
systematically checked and strengthened by the above-mentioned quantitative analysis. In line the 
interdisciplinary approach was privileged in this study, we mobilized the sociological studies of 
organizations (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). In an inductive logic, the aim of this initiative was to better 
define the role of actors who rely on the wildlife (villages) at the one hand and those whose have the 
conservation of wildlife resources as their role (Congolese institute of nature conservation) .This 
approach allows us to observe strictly the relations of different forces in the local governance of wildlife
in Rubi-Tele hunting domain landscape in focusing on Mabanga and Ngbete villages. At the sociology 
approach of the organization, we have associated critically observation of governance process of 
commons (Ostrom 1990, Locher 2013). This combination was made for understanding how the role and 
formal and informal interest of the local actors in the wildlife governance resources impact negatively 
on the state of resources. Besides interpretations qualitative analysis of our date, a statistical analysis (R 
software) was also made.
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lead others. Those who have become leaders subsequently became by the head of group host’s will, and 
therefore, not enjoying any legitimacy within their entity. This situation leads to the uncontrolled 
exploitation of resources. However, when a resource is subjected to a common exploitation, it is doomed 
to disappear. Thus, when resources are degraded or depleted, it is local communities that will suffer
most; because of they are relying on those resources for their basic needs (Ostrom 1990). Considering 
that the common utilization of resources leads to depletion, Bigombe (2004) recommends initiating the 
villagers or local users to decentralized management. For him, this taste must be made with social 
institutions such as the lineages. Then it is possible to strengthen these local institutions, including 
increasing their abilities so that they can finally commit and respect of contracts relating to the use of 
natural resources. 
In comparing our results to theirs, we realize that ours differ from those found by Fairhead and 
Leach (1994), Andriamalala and Gardner (2010), and Tohinlo et al. (2001).The first found in the Mende
region (Eastern Africa) that the laws established by the local community was respected and it was
regulating access to the natural resources. The second found at Velondriake (southwestern Madagascar)
a local tool of governance of natural resources called ‘Dina’. The third authors found that in Benin, 
particularly in the complex of Agonvè, the rules of access and use of natural resources were adopted by 
local institutions (customary power) and respected by all.
3.5. Scarceness of game: Cause of traditional authority inaction
Although the chiefs of the villages of Mabanga and Ngbete do not have the absolute legitimacy, their 
populations recognize in them the possibility of denouncing unsustainable hunting practices close to the 
state administration which has invested them. However, the fact that they have no salary from 
administration, they prefer to hold one’s tongue. This is revealed in the statements required by the chief 
of Mabanga village. He declared: ‘How can we prohibit unsustainable hunting practices? We have no 
salary from government. The latter pays only the leaders of chieftaincies and sectors. We are not paid.
Therefore, hunting allows us to live. This is why we practice hunting as we cannot wait only the products 
of fields. Sometimes others members of the village come to offer us some game after a successful hunt’. 
The chief village’s argument needs to be qualified because unstainable hunting practices are not the sole 
cause of scarcity of game. In the context of poverty as is the case of villages which are located in this 
hunting domain, populations rely not only on hunting activities. Beyond hunting, they practice also 
agriculture and charcoal production which are the cornerstone activities of deforestation. Though, the 
deforestation is the base of the rarefaction of game. However, there is clear evidence that attempts to 
protect or re-stablish wildlife resources that into consideration the socio-economic needs of local people 
are doomed (Lewis et al. n.d.).
villages located in this hunting domain who is responsible of the degradation of natural resources in 
general and wildlife resources in particular. Those words show clearly the opposition which characterize 
the key actors in governance wildlife resources in this hunting domain. It does prove that where 
resources are linked with survival people with very low incomes survive as best they can. The temptation 
to break preservation laws is great, since wild animals can provide food and cash. Furthermore, the 
people who should enforce the law (agents of Congolese institute of nature conservation for instance)
often receive inadequate salaries and therefore they may be tempted to turn a blind eye to or even to aid 
exploiters (Lewis et al. n.d.). For Mampeta (2017), the matter of wildlife conservation comes from the 
fact that the policy of protected areas in Africa is built on the dichotomy of land tenure legacy of 
colonialism and nationalism. In this case, we support with Lewis et al. (n.d.) that the urgent requirement 
today is for a significant and sustained effort to include the evaluation, development, management and 
utilization of wild animals in national plans for socio-economic development. The involvement of 
national planning and financial institutions at all levels is essential and assistance may also be required 
from competent international agencies to ensure success. At the same time long term sustained 
utilization of wildlife resources cannot succeed without local people participating in management and 
receiving a fair share of the benefits that accrue.
3.4. Traditional power crisis as a cause of natural resource degradation 
Chiefs and /or headmen are the cornerstones of African rural societies and the traditional customs that 
bind and regulate village communities (Lewis et al. n.d.) because of their authority. For, the authority is 
the ability of an actor to act on others, is the recognition of formal actor A to govern other (Crozier and
Friedberg 1977, Weber 1978). The abolition of these powers during and after colonial administration 
has led to situation where central governments are unable to sustain the needs of adequate law 
enforcement to protect wildlife resources. Land tenure and access to natural resources were formerly 
determined by these chiefs in the common interests. The case of Mabanga and Ngbete villages reveals 
the inescapable role of traditional authority. The population are consciousness that when disorder 
became rule of life in any society, traditional authority may play great role. But concerning the depletion 
of their wildlife resources, they are disappointed in the fact that traditional authority, especially the 
chiefs of their villages are unable to stop the degradation of resources. No surprising for them to argue 
I the following words when we ask them if their chiefs cannot stop the depletion of wildlife resources. 
They react in saying that: ‘what kinds of chief have we? They are powerless and lack initiative. They 
are unable to regulate access to our forestland’. 
Free access to resources natural wildlife including in the villages’ surveyed notes the lack of 
organization at the local level and the weakness of traditional power. It should be noted that this 
weakness is rooted in the context that characterise the creation of the surveyed villages. Created by
Ngelema tribe from Basoko territory and around (Province Tshopo), none of them had legitimacy to
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Free access to resources natural wildlife including in the villages’ surveyed notes the lack of 
organization at the local level and the weakness of traditional power. It should be noted that this 
weakness is rooted in the context that characterise the creation of the surveyed villages. Created by
Ngelema tribe from Basoko territory and around (Province Tshopo), none of them had legitimacy to
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these conditions are not considered by stakeholders, the consequence will be the loss of these species as 
it was the case in the Amazon and Congo basins (Nasi et al. 2011).  
4. Conclusion
The sustainable management of wildlife resources in Rubi-Tele hunting domain requires consideration
of different perceptions and practices of wildlife resources’ users. However, users developed since years, 
strategies that allow them easy access to those natural resources despite the presence of Congolese
institute of nature conservation agents who are in charge of controlling this area. In the context of 
weakness and incapacity of government to manage sustainably this protected area, it was important to 
focus on the ability of traditional authority that are representing administration among natural resources’
users in Mabanga and Ngbete villages in order to analyse their ability of ensuring the sustainable 
management of wildlife resources. The findings show that the management of the wildlife resources by 
the villages concerned by our survey is not possible for the following reasons: (1) the omission of Rubi-
Tele hunting domain as much as by the government than the NGOs of conservation. This hunting 
domain does not benefit neither of the regular functioning fees from the government nor the support
from nature protection international NGOs. This situation leads to the Governance characterized by 
mistrust of actors (2) because of absence of boundaries between hunting grounds and villages. Beyond 
the above reasons, let’s confirm together with the findings that (3) traditional power crisis is one of the 
causes of natural resource degradation. This reality comes from the context of creation of those villages
that leads nowadays to the Scarceness of game which has negative impact (4) on the wildlife resources.
To change this situation requires considering the life mode of population who lives in this hunting 
domain; to involve him in the management. It is to say that they have to participate in all decisions which 
concern this hunting domain. These populations are ready to use wildlife resources sustainably, but on 
one condition: they want to see the positive impact of conservation on their livelihoods. Therefore, it 
appears urgent for Congolese national institute of conservation which is in charge of the management 
of this hunting domain to work in synergy with local population and traditional authority. 
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situation is justified by the fact that 68% of respondents have decided to practice hunting more than 3
times between two weeks. During this hunting period, most hunters capture on average, fewer than 5
games whose species are indicated by the graph Below (Figure2).
The figure above indicates that two species are the most captured. It concerns Cephalophus dorsalis
and Cephalophus monticola each representing 25% of the catches made. On the other hand, the least 
species caught remains Manis sp which represent 1%. These results do not differ from those found by
Ndambo (2014). The latter noted that the hunting pressure is mainly on large rodents and which 
represent 80% of captured animals on Matadi- Boma road.
Indeed, Madzou and Ebanega (2006) found in Southeast of Cameroon at the north periphery of the
Boumba-Bek reserve that about 450 animals captured by villagers hunters, the majority consisted of 
ungulates and primates which represent more than 88% of the total and antelopes (Cephalophes sp.) and 
monkeys (Cercopithecus sp.) were the proportion of game.
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the above reasons, let’s confirm together with the findings that (3) traditional power crisis is one of the 
causes of natural resource degradation. This reality comes from the context of creation of those villages
that leads nowadays to the Scarceness of game which has negative impact (4) on the wildlife resources.
To change this situation requires considering the life mode of population who lives in this hunting 
domain; to involve him in the management. It is to say that they have to participate in all decisions which 
concern this hunting domain. These populations are ready to use wildlife resources sustainably, but on 
one condition: they want to see the positive impact of conservation on their livelihoods. Therefore, it 
appears urgent for Congolese national institute of conservation which is in charge of the management 
of this hunting domain to work in synergy with local population and traditional authority. 
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the organizers of the first Rwanda workshop. The authors would 
also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this paper for their comments and suggestions. 
Funding
This research was mainly funded by the research-development project ‘Forest/EU’ implanted in the 
Centre for International forest Research (CIFOR).
3.6. Impact of users’ practices
The hunting impact on wildlife resource as revealed by the decrease (84%) in the production game. This 
situation is justified by the fact that 68% of respondents have decided to practice hunting more than 3
times between two weeks. During this hunting period, most hunters capture on average, fewer than 5
games whose species are indicated by the graph Below (Figure2).
The figure above indicates that two species are the most captured. It concerns Cephalophus dorsalis
and Cephalophus monticola each representing 25% of the catches made. On the other hand, the least 
species caught remains Manis sp which represent 1%. These results do not differ from those found by
Ndambo (2014). The latter noted that the hunting pressure is mainly on large rodents and which 
represent 80% of captured animals on Matadi- Boma road.
Indeed, Madzou and Ebanega (2006) found in Southeast of Cameroon at the north periphery of the
Boumba-Bek reserve that about 450 animals captured by villagers hunters, the majority consisted of 
ungulates and primates which represent more than 88% of the total and antelopes (Cephalophes sp.) and 
monkeys (Cercopithecus sp.) were the proportion of game.
Figure 2. Game currently captured in Rubi-Tele hunting domain
Focusing on the above reality, some scholars consider that Wildlife management typically 
considers 2 kinds of capacity. The one which interests us is the first which is described as wildlife 
acceptance capacity (Decker and Purdy 1988), cultural carrying capacity (Minnis and Peyton 1995), and 
wildlife stakeholder acceptance capacity (Carpenter et al. 2000). Each stakeholder has a capacity relative 
to positive or negative impacts. Or acceptance capacity varies with stakeholder knowledge, beliefs, and 
attitudes, and with their economic, social, and environmental conditions (Riley and Decker 2000). If 
Artherurus 
Africanus ( Gray, 
1842)
11% Cricetomys emini 
(Linnaeus, 1758)
7%
Cephalophus 
dorsalis (Gray, 
1846)
25%Cephalophus 
monticola 
(Thunberg, 1789)
25%
Potamocherus 
porcus 
( Waterhouse, 
1840)
7%
Manis sp
1%
Cercopithecus 
sp
22%
Pan troglodytes
2%
Eliezer Majambu et al.
― 243 ―
Congo (DRC)’. Land 8(5): 74. doi:10.3390/land8050074. 
Mampeta Wabasa, S. 2017. ‘Repenser le rôle des institutions de conservation de la nature à l'ère de la 
globalisation en Afrique: A propos du Parc National de la Salonga (RDC)’. European Scientific 
Journal 13(11): 92–111.
Michon, G. and B. Moizo 2011. ‘Des forêts et des hommes: 2. Qu'est-ce qu'une forêt?: Le point de vue 
des sciences humaines: Les réponses des sciences de l'homme et de la société.’ In Des forêts et des
Hommes. Eds. C. Fontaine, G. Michon, and B. Moizo, Marseille: IRD, p.6.
Minnis, D.L. and R.B. Peyton 1995. ‘Cultural carrying capacity: Modeling a notion’. In Urban deer: a 
mangeable resource? Proceedings of the sympsium of the 55th Midwest Fish & Wildlife Conference.
Ed. J.B. McAninch, North Central Section of the Wildlife Society, 12-14 December 1993, St Louis, 
Missuri, USA, pp.19–34. 
Morin, E. 1977. La méthode 1. La nature de la nature. Paris: Seuil.
Nasi, R., A. Taber, and N. Van Vliet 2011. ‘Empty forests, empty stomachs? Bushmeat and livelihoods 
in Congo and Amazon Basins’. International Forestry Review 13(3): 355–368.  
Ndambo, M.N. 2014. ‘Participation des communautés locales et gestion durable des forêts: Cas de la 
réserve de la biosphère de Luki en République Démocratique du Congo’. PhD. Thesis, Université 
Laval, Québec City, Canada. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Comons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. London: 
Cambridge University Press.
Oyono, P.R., J.C. Ribot, and A.M. Larson 2006. ‘Green and black gold in rural Cameroon : Natural 
resources for local governance, justice and sustainability’. Environmental Governance in Africa 
Working Papers WP # 22. 
Riley, S.J., and D.J. Decker 2000. ‘Wildlife stakeholder acceptance capacity of cougars in Montana’.
Wildlife Society Bulletin 28(4): 931–939. 
Tohinlo, P., R. Mongbo, and A. Floquet 2011. ‘Approche institutionnelle et économie de gestion du 
complexe fluvio-lacustre d’Agonvè’. In II ème colloque des sciences, cultures et technologies de 
l’UAC - Bénin, 6 - 10 juin 2011 au centre CIEVRA, Bénin Atelier IV: Sciences économiques et de 
gestion.
Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Oakland: University of 
California Press.
World Bank 2003. World Development Report 2003: Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World-
Transforming Institutions, Growth and Quality of life. Washington, DC: World Bank.
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5985 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO> 
Yantibossi, K. 2011. ‘Cogestion de la réserve de biosphère de la Pendjari: Approche concertée pour la 
conservation de la biodiversité et le développement économique local’. Thèse de Doctrat, 
Université d’Abomey-Calavi.
References
Andriamalala, G. and C.J. Gardner 2010. ‘L’utilisation du dina comme outil de gouvernance des 
ressources naturelles : Leçons tirées de Velondriake, sud-ouest de Madagascar’. Tropical
Conservation Science 3(4): 447–472. 
Bigombe, P. 2004. Le retournement de l'Etat forestier: L'endroit et l'envers du processus de gestion 
forestière au Cameroun. Yaoundé: Presses de l'Ucac.
Bonye 2007. Traditional Institutions and the Management of Natural Resources in Ghana. 
Carpenter, L.H., D.J. Decker, and J.F. Lipscomb 2000. ‘Stakeholder acceptance capacity in wildlfe 
management’. Human Dimensions of Wildlife 5: 5–19. 
Chambers, R. and G.R Conway 1991. ‘Sustainable rural livelihoods: pratical concepts for the 21st 
century’. IDS Discussion Paper 296. 
Counsell, S. 2006. Forest Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An NGO Perspective. 
Brussels: FERN. 
Creswell, J.W. 2009. Reseach Design Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. 
London: SAGE Publications.
Crozier, M. and E. Friedberg 1977. L’acteur et le système: Les conraintes de l'action collective. Paris: 
Seuil. 
Decker, D.J. and K.G. Purdy 1988. ‘Towards a concept of wildlife acceptance capcity in wildlife 
management’. Wildlife Society Bulletin 16: 53–57. 
Eba’a Atyi, R. and N. Bayol 2009. ‘Les forêts de la république démocratique du congo en 2008’. In Les 
forêts du bassin du Congo: Etat des forêts en 2008. Eds. C. de Wasseige and D. Devers, 
Luxembourg: Commission européenne, pp.115–128. 
Fairhead, F. and M. Leach. 1994. ‘Représentations culturelles africaines et gestion de l’environnement’.
Politique africaines (53):11–24. 
Kyale, J.K. and A.M.N. Maindo 2017. ‘Pratiques traditionnelles de conservation de la nature à l’épreuve 
des faits chez les peuples riverains de la réserve de biosphère de Yangambi (RDC)’. European 
Science Journal 13(8): 328–356. 
Lewis, D.M., A. Mwenya, and G.B Kaweche n.d. African Solutions to Wildlife Problems in Africa: 
Insights from a Community-based Project in Zambia. FAO.
Locher, F. 2013. ‘Les pâturages de la Guerre froide: Garrett Hardin et la «tragédie des communs»’. 
Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 60–1(1): 7.
Madzou, Y.C. and M.O. Ebanega 2006. ‘Wild game and its use in the tropical environment, Cameroon 
- The forest in search of a balance between exploitation for survival and for conservation in the 
Northern Region of Boumba-Bek (South East Cameroon)’. Nature & Faune 21: 18–33.  
Majambu, E., S. Mampeta Wabasa., C. Welepele Elatre., L. Boutinot, and S. Ongolo 2019. ‘Can 
traditional authority improve the governance of forestland and sustainability? Case study from the 
Governing wildlife resource in DRC
― 244 ―
Congo (DRC)’. Land 8(5): 74. doi:10.3390/land8050074. 
Mampeta Wabasa, S. 2017. ‘Repenser le rôle des institutions de conservation de la nature à l'ère de la 
globalisation en Afrique: A propos du Parc National de la Salonga (RDC)’. European Scientific 
Journal 13(11): 92–111.
Michon, G. and B. Moizo 2011. ‘Des forêts et des hommes: 2. Qu'est-ce qu'une forêt?: Le point de vue 
des sciences humaines: Les réponses des sciences de l'homme et de la société.’ In Des forêts et des
Hommes. Eds. C. Fontaine, G. Michon, and B. Moizo, Marseille: IRD, p.6.
Minnis, D.L. and R.B. Peyton 1995. ‘Cultural carrying capacity: Modeling a notion’. In Urban deer: a 
mangeable resource? Proceedings of the sympsium of the 55th Midwest Fish & Wildlife Conference.
Ed. J.B. McAninch, North Central Section of the Wildlife Society, 12-14 December 1993, St Louis, 
Missuri, USA, pp.19–34. 
Morin, E. 1977. La méthode 1. La nature de la nature. Paris: Seuil.
Nasi, R., A. Taber, and N. Van Vliet 2011. ‘Empty forests, empty stomachs? Bushmeat and livelihoods 
in Congo and Amazon Basins’. International Forestry Review 13(3): 355–368.  
Ndambo, M.N. 2014. ‘Participation des communautés locales et gestion durable des forêts: Cas de la 
réserve de la biosphère de Luki en République Démocratique du Congo’. PhD. Thesis, Université 
Laval, Québec City, Canada. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Comons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. London: 
Cambridge University Press.
Oyono, P.R., J.C. Ribot, and A.M. Larson 2006. ‘Green and black gold in rural Cameroon : Natural 
resources for local governance, justice and sustainability’. Environmental Governance in Africa 
Working Papers WP # 22. 
Riley, S.J., and D.J. Decker 2000. ‘Wildlife stakeholder acceptance capacity of cougars in Montana’.
Wildlife Society Bulletin 28(4): 931–939. 
Tohinlo, P., R. Mongbo, and A. Floquet 2011. ‘Approche institutionnelle et économie de gestion du 
complexe fluvio-lacustre d’Agonvè’. In II ème colloque des sciences, cultures et technologies de 
l’UAC - Bénin, 6 - 10 juin 2011 au centre CIEVRA, Bénin Atelier IV: Sciences économiques et de 
gestion.
Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Oakland: University of 
California Press.
World Bank 2003. World Development Report 2003: Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World-
Transforming Institutions, Growth and Quality of life. Washington, DC: World Bank.
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5985 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO> 
Yantibossi, K. 2011. ‘Cogestion de la réserve de biosphère de la Pendjari: Approche concertée pour la 
conservation de la biodiversité et le développement économique local’. Thèse de Doctrat, 
Université d’Abomey-Calavi.
References
Andriamalala, G. and C.J. Gardner 2010. ‘L’utilisation du dina comme outil de gouvernance des 
ressources naturelles : Leçons tirées de Velondriake, sud-ouest de Madagascar’. Tropical
Conservation Science 3(4): 447–472. 
Bigombe, P. 2004. Le retournement de l'Etat forestier: L'endroit et l'envers du processus de gestion 
forestière au Cameroun. Yaoundé: Presses de l'Ucac.
Bonye 2007. Traditional Institutions and the Management of Natural Resources in Ghana. 
Carpenter, L.H., D.J. Decker, and J.F. Lipscomb 2000. ‘Stakeholder acceptance capacity in wildlfe 
management’. Human Dimensions of Wildlife 5: 5–19. 
Chambers, R. and G.R Conway 1991. ‘Sustainable rural livelihoods: pratical concepts for the 21st 
century’. IDS Discussion Paper 296. 
Counsell, S. 2006. Forest Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An NGO Perspective. 
Brussels: FERN. 
Creswell, J.W. 2009. Reseach Design Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. 
London: SAGE Publications.
Crozier, M. and E. Friedberg 1977. L’acteur et le système: Les conraintes de l'action collective. Paris: 
Seuil. 
Decker, D.J. and K.G. Purdy 1988. ‘Towards a concept of wildlife acceptance capcity in wildlife 
management’. Wildlife Society Bulletin 16: 53–57. 
Eba’a Atyi, R. and N. Bayol 2009. ‘Les forêts de la république démocratique du congo en 2008’. In Les 
forêts du bassin du Congo: Etat des forêts en 2008. Eds. C. de Wasseige and D. Devers, 
Luxembourg: Commission européenne, pp.115–128. 
Fairhead, F. and M. Leach. 1994. ‘Représentations culturelles africaines et gestion de l’environnement’.
Politique africaines (53):11–24. 
Kyale, J.K. and A.M.N. Maindo 2017. ‘Pratiques traditionnelles de conservation de la nature à l’épreuve 
des faits chez les peuples riverains de la réserve de biosphère de Yangambi (RDC)’. European 
Science Journal 13(8): 328–356. 
Lewis, D.M., A. Mwenya, and G.B Kaweche n.d. African Solutions to Wildlife Problems in Africa: 
Insights from a Community-based Project in Zambia. FAO.
Locher, F. 2013. ‘Les pâturages de la Guerre froide: Garrett Hardin et la «tragédie des communs»’. 
Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 60–1(1): 7.
Madzou, Y.C. and M.O. Ebanega 2006. ‘Wild game and its use in the tropical environment, Cameroon 
- The forest in search of a balance between exploitation for survival and for conservation in the 
Northern Region of Boumba-Bek (South East Cameroon)’. Nature & Faune 21: 18–33.  
Majambu, E., S. Mampeta Wabasa., C. Welepele Elatre., L. Boutinot, and S. Ongolo 2019. ‘Can 
traditional authority improve the governance of forestland and sustainability? Case study from the 
Eliezer Majambu et al.
― 245 ―
